Investigations by Make
Tesla Investigations
26 investigations. 7 open. 19 closed.
Investigation Records
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Teslaâs Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the systemâs ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Teslaâs assessment of their safety impact. Teslaâs FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a s
Emergency egress controls are not readily accessible and clearly identifiable.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on November 24, 2025, requesting a defect investigation intothe mechanical door release on model year (MY) 2022 Tesla Model 3. The petition cites allegations that the mechanical door release is hidden, unlabeled, and not intuitive to locate during an emergency.The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11698174. A defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.
Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
The Office of Defects Investigation (âODIâ) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traï¬c safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traï¬c laws. ODIâs investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driverâs supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identiï¬ed a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traï¬c safety laws. Although report
Electronic door handles become inoperative
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received nine Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting an inability to open doors on Model Year (MY) 2021 Tesla Model Y vehicles. The most commonly reported scenarios involved parents exiting the vehicle after a drive cycle in order to remove a child from the back seat or placing a child in the back seat before starting a drive cycle. In those events, the parents were unable to reopen a door to regain access to the vehicle. Four of these VOQs reported resorting to breaking a window to regain entry into the vehicle. Although Tesla vehicles have manual door releases inside of the cabin, in these situations, a child may not be able to access or operate the releases even if the vehicleâs driver is aware of them. As a result, in these instances, an occupant who remains inside a vehicle in this condition may be unable to be rapidly retrieved by persons outside of the vehicle. Entrapment in a vehicle is particularly concerning in emergency situations, such as when children are entrapped in a hot vehicle. For awareness, NHTSA has a Child Heatstroke Campaign that highlights the dangers to children entrapped in hot vehicles. Based on ODI
Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
The Office of Defects Investigation (âODIâ) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (âTeslaâ) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the âSGOâ), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Teslaâs data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior inc
Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
On October 17, 2024, NHTSAâs Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Teslaâs Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Teslaâs assessment of their safety impact. Teslaâs FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided b
Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Teslaâs Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Teslaâs Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that âthe prominence and scope of the systemâs controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,â and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Teslaâs Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesl
Loss of steering control
On July 28, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23014) to investigate instances of loss of electronic power-assisted steering in MY 2023 Tesla Model 3 and MY 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla, Inc. The complaints allege a sudden and unexpected inability to turn the steering wheel or an increase in effort required to turn the steering wheel. These conditions were alleged to occur both during the drive cycle, at various speeds, and at vehicle start up. Consumers reported receiving the warning message âSteering assist reducedâ either before, during, or after the loss of steering control, and some consumers described their steering begin to feel ânotchyâ or âclickyâ either prior to or just after the incident. On February 1, 2024, PE23014 was upgraded to EA24001 to further investigate the alleged defect in the affected vehicles. Tesla identified the cause of the increase in steering effort as an overvoltage breakdown (the voltage applied exceeds the maximum design limit), which can overstress motor drive components on the printed circuit board of the vehicleâs steering Electronic Control Unit (ECU). If the prim
Loss of steering control
On July 28, 2023, The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23-014) after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting loss of steering control in model years (MY) 2023 Tesla Model 3 and Y vehicles. During PE23-014, ODI interviewed complainants, sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla, and convened technical meetings with Tesla that included a joint inspection of a crashed vehicle. The investigation identified 2,388 total complaints regarding the alleged defect, including 124 complaints through VOQs and 2,264 complaints through manufacturer data. ODI is associating 1 crash to this investigation (11544655), where a driver was unable to complete a right hand turn in the intersection and hit a vehicle. This vehicle was subject to a joint inspection by ODI and Tesla. The steering rack was recovered by ODI with the consumerâs permission. ODIâs interviews of allegations supplied to the agency, in the form of VOQs, identified patterns of the incoming complaint traffic. Complaints allege an inability to turn the steering wheel, while other complaints allege an increase in required effort to turn the steering wheel. Â These condi
Sudden Unintended Acceleration
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
Defect Petition Interlock Request
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a ârecall of all Tesla carsâ produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driverâs foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Teslaâs response to ODIâs Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regene
Front seat belt anchor detachment
On March 24, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) after receiving 2 consumer complaints alleging the front seat belts had suddenly detached from the outboard lap pretensioner anchor while in motion in model year (MY) 2022-2023 Tesla Model X vehicles. In its June 19, 2023 response to ODIâs May 4, 2023 Information Request letter of the PE, Tesla reported that its review of field repair data identified 12 additional warranty claims of the subject condition in the affected vehicles. On July 14, 2023, Tesla filed a safety recall (NHTSA No. 23V-488) of 15,869 MY 2021 - 2023 Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles. The recall remedy is an inspection of the 1st row seat belts for proper connection to the pretensioners. Service personnel will resecure the pretensioners or, if necessary, replace the seat belt retractor assembly. In its recall filing, Tesla stated that effective June 22, 2023, it had updated procedures requiring a first-row seat belt to be disconnected from- and reconnected to- its pretensioner anchor to include additional visual aids to assist technicians and require a pull test-step to confirm that the seat belt was reconnecte
Steering Wheel Detachment
On March 4, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE23003 to investigate two reports of steering loss on model year (MY) 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles due to the detachment of the steering wheel from the steering column while the vehicle was in motion. ODI confirmed from Tesla that in both cases, the vehicles were delivered to the owners missing the retaining bolt (P/N 1036655-00-A) used to secure the steering wheel to a splined shaft on the steering column. Tesla repaired both vehicles under warranty. ODI further learned that both 2023 MY Model Y vehicles had been manufactured in the first week of January 2023 at Teslaâs Austin, TX and Fremont, CA manufacturing facilities, respectively. Both vehicles had received end of production line repairs (rectification) requiring removal and reinstallation of the steering wheel before release from the factory. End of line rectification is an offline process manufacturers use to repair any defects found prior to vehicle release from the factory. It often requires removing and reinstalling unrelated components to access and correct the issue detected during inspections. This service process usually takes place outside the asse
Pedestrian alert sounds
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
Autopilot System Driver Controls
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Teslaâs Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driverâs supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicleâs following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the pr
Unexpected Brake Activation
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 â 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as âphantom brakingâ. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to o
Tesla Passenger Play
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving tas
Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators us
Autopilot & First Responder Scenes
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by u
Fore Link Failure
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identified 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February 2017, to replace the subject component on a sub-population of vehicles originally equipped with the subject fore links and built between 19 January 2016 and 25 May 2016.This sub population does not cover 75% instances of failures identified in this investigation. Additional damage to other vehicle com
Loss of rearview camera
On November 20, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA) 20-003 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-18 Tesla Model S and model year (MY) 2016-2018 Tesla Model X vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. During its investigation, ODI learned that the expected usage life rating for the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device is approximately 3,000 âP/Eâ or Program-Erase cycles, after which the eMMC NAND flash memory device would become fully consumed and no longer be operational, leading to a failure of the media control unit (MCU). At a daily cycle usage rate of 1.4 per block, accumulation of 3,000 P/E cycles would take only 5-6 years. Historically, the expected life of a vehicle generally far exceeds 5-6 years of service. ODI believes that a 5- or 6-year life expectancy for a component integral to providing the driver with safety functions is insufficient. During our review of the data, Tesla provided confirmation that all units will inevitably fail given the memory deviceâs finite storage capa
Loss of rearview camera
On June 22, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE20-010 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-2015 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. EMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles. The subject MCU allegedly fails prematurely due to memory wear-out of the eMMC NAND flash. Tesla used the same MCU with the Tegra 3 processor in approximately 159 thousand 2012-2018 Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles built by Tesla through early-2018. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE20-010, Tesla provided ODI with 2,399 complaints and field reports, 7,777 warranty claims, and 4,746 non-warranty claims related to MCU replacements. The data show failure rates over 30 percent in certain build months and accelerating failure trends after 3 to 4 years-in-service.According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardwar
Sudden Unintended Acceleration
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evi
Battery Management Software Updates
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high Supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (HV) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the United States and, through August 2021, the vol
Automatic vehicle control systems
On May 7, 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer crossing an uncontrolled intersection on a highway west of Williston, Florida, resulting in fatal injuries to the Tesla driver.Data obtained from the Model S indicated that:1) the Tesla was being operated in Autopilot mode at the time of the collision; 2) the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or automated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, steering or other actions to avoid the collision.On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to ?examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.?The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) analyzed the following subjects as part of NHTSA?s examination of the design and performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system:1) Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system design and performance in the subject Tesla and peer vehicles; 2) human-machine interface issues related to Autopilot operating mode; 3) data from crash incidents related to Tesla?s Autopilot and AEB systems; and 4) changes Tesla has implemented in the Autopilot and AEB systems.NHTSA?s examination did not identify any